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Abstract 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) has always been an essential research issue in safety 
critical systems. Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method (CREAM), as a well-known 
second generation HRA method is capable of conducting both retrospective and prospective 
analysis, thus being widely used in many sectors. However, the needs of addressing the use of 
a deterministic approach to configure common performance conditions (CPCs) and the 
assignment of the same importance to all the CPCs in a traditional CREAM method reveal a 
significant research gap to be fulfilled. This paper describes a modified CREAM 
methodology based on an Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach and a Decision Making Trial 
and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) technique for making human error probability 
quantification in CREAM rational. An illustrative case study associated with maritime 
operation is presented. The proposed method is validated by sensitivity analysis and the 
quantitative analysis result is verified through comparing the data and the benchmarking with 
the real data collected from Shanghai coastal waters. Its main contribution lies in that it for 
the first time addresses the data incompleteness in HEP, given that the previous relevant 
studies mainly focus on the fuzziness in data. The findings will provide useful insights for 
quantitative assessment of seafarers' errors to reduce maritime risks due to human errors. 
Keywords: Human reliability analysis, CREAM, HEP quantification, maritime transport, 
maritime risk 
 
1. Introduction 
Human error has caused many industrial accidents and disasters. Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA) has therefore been an essential research issue. With the development of new 
technologies, the emerge of complex systems such as Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and Very 
Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), makes the consequences of accidents more and more serious. 
Many approaches have been developed for facilitating human error quantification and human 
reliability analysis, such as Human Cognitive Reliability model (HCR) (Hannaman et al., 
1984), Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) (Embrey et al., 1984), Technique for 
Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) (Swain and Guttmann, 1983), Human Error 
Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) (Williams, 1988), A Technique for Human 
Error Analysis (ATHEANA) (Cooper et al., 1996), Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis 
                                                 
* Corresponding author. E-mail: z.yang@ljmu.ac.uk (Zaili Yang). 
  Tel: 0044 151 231 2531; fax: 0044 151 231 2453. 
2 
 
Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998), SPAR-H (Gertman et al., 2005) and Bayesian Network 
approach (Baraldi et al., 2015). There are also some specific methods developed in the 
literature for Human Error Probability (HEP) quantification (Sun et al., 2012). Such 
approaches have been widely applied to deal with human error and human factors in various 
sectors including nuclear (Alvarenga et al., 2014; Jang et al., 2013), spaceflight (Calhoun et 
al., 2013, 2014), marine and maritime (Akyuz and Celik, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Yang et al., 
2013; Akyuz, 2016; Chen et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2011), and civil infrastructure (Nan and 
Sansavini, 2016), etc.  
1.1. CREAM 
The well-known CREAM, established by Hollnagel in 1998 (Hollnagel, 1998), has been 
applied to human error quantification of safety-critical systems. Both retrospective and 
prospective analyses can be carried out for the diagnosis and prediction of industrial 
accidents and events. For the prospective analysis, two steps are designed for human error 
quantification which are a basic method and an extended method, respectively. The basic 
method is used for determination of control modes and corresponding error rate intervals at a 
screening stage, while the extended method is employed for error quantification of cognitive 
functions. However, the two inherently deterministic methods arguably lack capability of 
dealing with the uncertainties in common performance condition (CPC) configuration (Kim 
et al., 2006) and different weight assignments (He et al., 2008) to the CPCs in traditional 
CREAM. Recently, some studies have been conducted for the improvement of CREAM and 
HEP estimation by means of probabilistic techniques (Kim et al., 2006; Fujita and Hollnagel, 
2004), fuzzy approaches (Konstandinidou et al., 2006; Marseguerra et al., 2006, 2007; Wang 
et al., 2001; Yang et al., 2013; Ung et al., 2015), simplification (Sun et al., 2012; He et al., 
2008) and combination (Akyuz, 2015; Ribeiro, 2016). Fujita and Hollnagel (2004) designed a 
new version of basic method of CREAM and Kim et al. (2006) described a probabilistic 
approach for determining the control modes. Konstandinidou et al. (2006), Marseguerra et al. 
(2006, 2007 and Wang et al. (2001) presented fuzzy sets, fuzzy rules and fuzzy-clonal 
selection methods for contextual and reliability evaluation. However, the fuzzy model of 
CREAM brings on many redundant, self-contradictory rules, which would consume 
computational time, and lose the truth degree of the results (Wang et al., 2001). Sun et al. 
(2012) and He et al. (2008) simplified the CREAM for HEP point estimation while Lee et al. 
(2011) designed a CREAM-based communication error analysis method (CEAM) for 
communication error analysis. Akyuz (2015) constructed a risk-based CREAM model for 
HEP quantification towards the gas inerting process on-board crude oil tankers and Ribeiro et 
al (2016) presented a hybrid THERP-CREAM method to analysis the human reliability of 
Tokai-Mura accidents. Although showing attractiveness in terms of providing solutions to 
some of the inherent drawbacks of CREAM, such methods have not yet well addressed the 
incompleteness in subjective data from experts, revealing the need for further studies in the 
field.   
1.2. Evidential Reasoning (ER) and DEMATEL technique 
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) was developed by Dempster in 1967 (Dempster, 1967) and 
later refined by Shafer in 1976 (Shafer, 1976). Subsequently, DST is known as one of the 
most powerful tools to deal with uncertainty problems. The evidential reasoning (ER) 
approach (Yang and Singh, 1994; Yang et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2006), which was initially 
oriented to model multiple attribute decision analysis (MADA) problems is further developed 
for overcoming some weaknesses in DST. It is conducted by generating basic probability 
assignments (BPA) through the combination of degrees of belief (DoBs) and normalised 
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weights. It is because of the advantage of ER in modelling incompleteness that recently it has 
been widely applied in many domains such as safety assessment (Xi et al., 2008), 
environmental impact assessment (Wang et al., 2006) and software selection (Fu and Yang, 
2010). In this paper, the ER approach is employed for evaluating the CPCs and combining 
the DoBs to generate the BPA of CPCs in the modified CREAM methodology. The 
DEMATEL technique was developed by the Geneva Research Centre of the Battelle 
Memorial Institute (Fontela and Gabus, 1976; Gabus and Fontela, 1973). It presents the cause 
and effect groups within a system or subsystem by applying matrices and digraphs to 
visualise the structure of complicated causal relationships. The advantages of DEMATEL lie 
in its capability of effectively modelling and quantifying the causal relationships among 
interdependent factors. The DEMATEL has therefore been successfully applied in many 
fields including business (Tseng, 2009; Wu and Lee, 2007), engineering (Seyed-Hosseini et 
al., 2008), education (Tzeng et al., 2007) and social studies (Tamura and Akazawa, 2005). In 
this paper, the technique is used to model the dependency among CPCs and further, together 
with the assigned weights of CPCs, to determine the values of adjusting indices. Given the 
strengths of ER and DEMATEL in modelling uncertainties, this paper proposes a new 
modified CREAM method to calculate HEP in a rational way.  
Given their strengths in tackling different uncertainties exposed in traditional CREAM, ER 
and DEMATEL are combined to construct a new modified HEP quantification model of two 
stages, a general analysis stage and a quantification evaluation stage. The general analysis in 
Section 2 proposes an ER approach to model the incompleteness associated with CPC 
configuration and combination of DoBs, and to determine the corresponding control mode(s), 
probability intervals and the total state of context. The quantification evaluation in Section 3 
describes a DEMATEL technique to simulate the interdependency of CPCs and to determine 
the different weights of CPCs and adjusting index values. Consequently, a rational error 
probability can be obtained at this stage. In Section 4, an illustrative case study in maritime 
operations is presented and real data has been recorded to benchmark and validate the 
modified method and research findings. Section 5 concludes this paper. 
 
2. Modified CREAM: a general analysis 
The core of CREAM is the Contextual Control Model (COCOM). COCOM focuses on a 
principle that human cognition is not only a response to a serious input but also a close loop 
process of continuous purposive adjustment for intension. Four kinds of control modes are 
defined according to the human cognition and the context, which are determined by nine 
Common Performance Conditions (CPCs). The four control modes are “Scrambled”, 
“Opportunistic”, “Tactical” and “Strategic” respectively (Fig.1) while the nine CPCs are 
“Adequacy of organisation (CPC1)”, “Working conditions (CPC2)”, “Adequacy of man-
machine interface and operational support (CPC3)”, “Availability of procedures and plans 
(CPC4)”, “Number of simultaneous goals (CPC5)”, “Available time (CPC6)”, “Time of day 
(CPC7)”, “Adequacy of training and experience (CPC8)” and “Crew collaboration quality 
(CPC9)”, respectively (Table 1). Each CPC may be evaluated at different levels indicating an 
improved, not significant or reduced effect on human performance accordingly. The control 
mode and its wide failure interval are determined by the couple of (𝛴𝛴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝛴𝛴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼). For 
example, if an event is evaluated to have 5 CPCs of improved effects and 4 CPCs of reduced 
effects, then its corresponding COCOM will be “Tactical” according to Fig. 1 and failure 
probability interval will be 1E-3＜P＜1E-1 from Table 2. 
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Fig.1. Relation between CPCs and control modes (Hollnagel, 1998) 
 
Table1. 
Description of CPCs and associated linguistic variables (Hollnagel, 1998) 
CPC Level Effect 
CPC1 Adequacy of organization 
          (AOO) 
 
L11 Very efficient Improved 
L12 Efficient Not significant 
L13 Inefficient Reduced 
L14 Deficient Reduced 
CPC2 Working conditions 
          (WCO) 
 
L21 Advantageous Improved 
L22 Compatible Not significant 
L23 Incompatible Reduced 
CPC3 Adequacy of MMI and operational support 
          (MMI) 
L31 Supportive Improved 
L32 Adequate Not significant 
L33 Tolerable Not significant 
L34 Inappropriate Reduced 
CPC4 Availability of procedures/plans 
          (AOP) 
L41 Appropriate Improved 
L42 Acceptable Not significant 
L43 Inappropriate Reduced 
CPC5 Number of simultaneous goals 
          (NOS) 
 
L51 Fewer than capacity Not significant 
L52 Matching current capacity Not significant 
L53 More than capacity Reduced 
CPC6 Available time 
          (ATI) 
 
L61 Adequate Improved 
L62 Temporarily inadequate Not significant 
L63 Continuously inadequate Reduced 
CPC7 Time of day 
          (TOD) 
 
L71 Day-time (0600-1800) (adjusted) Not significant 
L72 Night-time (1700-2400) (unadjusted) Reduced 
L73 Night-time(0000-0700) (unadjusted) Reduced 
CPC8 Adequacy of  training and preparation 
          (AOT) 
 
L81 Adequate, high experience Improved 
L82 Adequate, limited experience Not significant 
L83 Inadequate Reduced 
CPC9 Crew collaboration quality 
          (CCQ) 
 
L91 Very efficient Improved 
L92 Efficient Not significant 
L93 Inefficient Not significant 
L94 Deficient Reduced 
 
2.1. Evaluating the CPCs using a DoB approach 
The traditional method for evaluating the level and its effect to human reliability is easy and 
visible. However, it only shows a general principle (Kim et al., 2006) thus revealing some 
problems in its practical applications. It needs to be further improved and developed in 
determining the levels of CPCs and its effect to human reliability rationally. It is well known 
that an exact evaluation of CPCs is important but very difficult for the performance 
prediction. Nevertheless, it is not always easy to specify CPCs exclusively, due to the 
insufficiency of information and data of the context under investigation. There would be a 
great amount of uncertainties in the specification of CPCs. For tackling such uncertainties, a 
new approach which can model the DoBs distribution in the specification of CPCs is 
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proposed. For example, an expert can give DoBs such as {0.2 Very efficient, 0.5 Efficient, 0.3 
Inefficient, 0 Deficient} instead of a “crisp” judgement when evaluating CPC1. One of the 
advantages of the DoB approach (Yang and Singh, 1994) is that the uncertainty associated 
with a CPC can be expressed in a rational way as required in practice. Second, a number of 
(𝛴𝛴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝛴𝛴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ) couples can be produced to indicate the possible contexts and to 
optimise the simulation of the associated operations. Third, the DoB approach allows the 
synthesis of CPCs specifications from multiple experts. It is noteworthy that the DoB 
approach for CPCs specification is an extension of the deterministic approach. When some 
CPCs are clearly specified, the DoB can be set to be 1 for the corresponding CPCs levels. 
The algorithm of combining the DoB structures given by multiple experts on CPCs levels is 
represented in Section 2.2. 
Although the rules of modelling the interdependence adjustment of CPCs in the traditional 
basic CREAM are presented, it was argued that the influence of such adjustment deems to be 
insignificant at a general analysis stage (Kim et al., 2006). The detailed consideration of 
modelling the CPC adjustment rules is therefore investigated in the detailed quantification 
analysis stage in Section 3. 
2.2. Combining the evaluations by experts using ER algorithm 
Let 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  denote the nth level of CPCi, then 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = {𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖1, … 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, … , 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}  be the frame of 
discernment which represents the levels of CPCi (1 ≤ i ≤ 9; n=1,…,N) and it is required to be 
a collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of hypotheses. If CPCi is evaluated to a 
level Lin by the expert Eg (1 ≤ g ≤ G) with a degree of belief 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 , we denote this evaluation by 
𝑆𝑆�𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔� = ��𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 ��, which is a distributed evaluation and referred to as a belief structure 
(Yang et al., 2006), where 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 ≥ 0 and 
�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 ≤ 1𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
                                                                                                                        (1) 
If ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 = 1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , it is called a complete evaluation. If  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 < 1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , the evaluation is 
incomplete, the difference (1-∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1 ) shows the degree of ignorance. 
In the first step, a DoB given to an evaluation level Lin by Eg is transformed into a basic 
probability mass by multiplying the given DoB 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔  by wg† (∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔 = 1𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔=1 ) which is defined as 
the relative importance of Eg. The liner function which transformed the DoB given to an 
evaluation Lin by Eg into a basic probability mass can be established as follows 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 = 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 ,𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁;𝑔𝑔 = 1, … ,𝐺𝐺                                                           (2) 
If 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔  satisfies Eq. (1), then ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 1 and accordingly (Yang et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2006; 
Yang et al., 2009; Yang and Wang, 2015). 
𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 = 1 −�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
= 1 −𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
                                                                (3) 
                                                 
† Expert knowledge is influenced by individual perspectives and goals (Ford and Serman, 1998). Therefore, 
complete impartiality of expert knowledge is often difficult to achieve. An important consideration is the 
weighting factors of experts. In this study, the weighting factors of experts are determined according to their 
professional position, service time and education level. 
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𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 = 1 −𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔                                                                                                          (4) 
𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 = 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔 �1 −�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
�                                                                                       (5) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔  is the basic probability mass which measures the belief exactly assigned to Lin and 
represents how strongly the expert Eg supports Lin. 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 = 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 + 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔  for all g=1,2,…,G. The 
probability mass of Eg (𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 ) unassigned to any individual Lin is split into two parts, one 
caused by the relative importance of Eg (𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 ), and the other due to the incompleteness of the 
belief degree assessment 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔  (𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 ). 
The second step is to obtain the total DoB (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) by combining the basic probability masses 
(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 ) generated above. Suppose the evaluation levels are mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive, Dempster’s rule of combination (Yang et al., 2006) can be applied to combine the 
basic probability masses. Suppose 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔) is the combined belief degree Lin by aggregating all 
the basic probability masses from the g experts and 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)  is the remaining belief degree 
unassigned to any Lin. Let 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼(1) = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  and 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(1) = 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖1 . Then the overall combined belief 
degree in Lin can be generated as follows (Yang et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2009; 
Yang et al., 2014). {𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}: 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔+1) = 𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔+1) �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔+1 + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔+1 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔+1�             (6) 
𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔) = 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔) + 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)     𝑔𝑔 = 1,2, … ,𝐺𝐺 − 1                                           (7) {𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖}:  𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔+1) = 𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔+1) �𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔+1 + 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔+1 + 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔+1�              (8) 
𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔+1) = 𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔+1) �𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔+1�                                                                  (9) 
𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔+1) = �1 −��𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝑔𝑔)𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑔𝑔+1𝑖𝑖
ℎ=1
ℎ≠𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
�
−1 ,𝑔𝑔 = 1,2, … ,𝐺𝐺 − 1               (10) 
{𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}: 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝐺𝐺)1 −𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝐺𝐺)  (𝑛𝑛 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁)                                                           (11) 
{𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖}: 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝐺𝐺)1 −𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(𝐺𝐺)                                                                                            (12) 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  shows the combined DoB assigned to Lin in the levels of CPCi (Li) and 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 
indicates the normalised remaining DoB unassigned to any Lin. 
2.3. Calculating HEP of the whole task 
In terms of the DoB approach for CPCs specification and the ER algorithm, the 
corresponding couple (𝛴𝛴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝛴𝛴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) can be obtained and presented by decimal figures 
instead of integer ones. It is therefore difficult to directly use Figure 1 and Table 2 to 
determine the probability intervals. For example, if a couple (1.5, 3.2) is obtained, the control 
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mode is at the boundary between Strategic and Tactical from Fig. 1, indicating that it belongs 
to both Strategic and Tactical control modes. Therefore, its probability interval can be 
determined by the intersection of the probability intervals of Strategic and Tactical modes. 
The probability intervals of the three boundaries between the four control modes are obtained 
through deriving the intersection between two neighbouring intervals. For example, the 
intersection between the probability intervals of Strategic and Tactical modes is 1E-3＜P＜
1E-2. Consequently, all the probability intervals describing the original 4 control modes and 
the three boundaries between them are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. 
The control modes and probability intervals 
Control mode Probability interval 
Strategic 5E-5＜P＜1E-2 
Boundary between St. and Ta. 1E-3＜P＜1E-2 
Tactical 1E-3＜P＜1E-1 
Boundary between Ta. and Op. 1E-2＜P＜1E-1 
Opportunistic 1E-2＜P＜5E-1 
Boundary between Op. and Sc. 1E-1＜P＜5E-1 
Scrambled 1E-1＜P＜1E-0 
 
Although the above analysis can assist in narrowing the intervals, the failure probabilities 
obtained are still presented in a wide range interval and may not be sufficient for appropriate 
screening and control purposes.  Further investigation at the general analysis stage is carried 
out based on a context variable which describes the total state of the nine CPCs. For better 
description of the context variable, the following assumptions are made (Sun et al., 2012; He 
et al., 2008; Apostolakis et al., 1988). 
(1) The context variable is continuous. 
(2) The HEP is also continuous. 
(3) HEP exponentially increases or decreases with the context variations. 
 
The above assumptions have been used in many HRA methods and the results are validated 
to be acceptable in practice (Sue et al., 2012). According to the assumptions above, the 
functional relation between the context variable (denoted as x) and HEP can be constructed as 
follows (He et al., 2008): 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥𝜌𝜌(𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥)                                                                                     (13) 
where 𝑥𝑥 = 𝛴𝛴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝛴𝛴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, ρ and φ are two constants to be determined.  
Obviously, the maximum and minimum values of x are 7 and -9 (from Table 1) respectively 
as presented in Eq. (14).  
HEPmax=ρexp (-9φ),  
HEPmin=ρexp (7φ)                                                                                                 (14) 
It can be found that HEPmin=0.00005 and HEPmax=1 from the failure probabilities in Table 2 
(Hollnagel, 1998). Then, the values of ρ and φ could be calculated as 3.81E-3 and -0.619. 
When x=0, the context is in a neutral state. At this moment, the HEP indicates a value 
without any positive or negative effects received from the operational context where HEP0 = 
ρ= 3.81E-3. 
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Thus for a certain value of x, Eq. (15) could be utilized for a general analysis: 
HEP=HEP0·exp (-0.619x) =3.81×10-3 exp (-0.619x)                                                (15) 
Eq. (15) reflects the functional relation between the overall state of context and HEP. It can 
be used to determine the extent to which the context of the whole task is of positive, neutral 
or negative effect on human performance in the investigation of an event. 
 
3. Modified CREAM: an extended quantification 
3.1. Identifying the weights (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) of CPCs through DEMATEL 
In the traditional CREAM, each CPC plays the same role on the influence to the operational 
context and HEP, though it is not a real case in practice. For example, it is often the case that 
the negative effect received from “night time” of CPC7 TOD may be less than the one from 
“continuously inadequate” (available time) associated with CPC6 ATI. Therefore, appropriate 
weights should be assigned to the CPCs to reflect their contribution towards HEP 
(Marseguerra et al., 2007). 
The DEMATEL method is used to calculate the weights of CPCs in this section. The step of 
DEMATEL can be summarized as follows (Wu, 2008; Fontela and Gabus, 1976; Gabus and 
Fonela, 1973). 
Firstly, each expert is asked to evaluate the direct influence between any two CPCs by using 
scores ranging from 0, 1, 2, and 3 which represent “no influence”, “low influence”, “medium 
influence” and “high influence” respectively in terms of synopsis of influence relationship 
among the CPCs in the traditional CREAM (Table 3). The notation of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  indicates the 
degree to which the expert believes CPCi affects CPCj. For i = j, the diagonal elements are 
set to zero. For each expert, a 9×9 (there are 9 CPCs) matrix can be established as 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔 = �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 �, 
where g is the number of experts with 1 ≤ 𝑔𝑔 ≤ 𝐺𝐺, and G is the total number of experts. Thus, 
𝐴𝐴1,𝐴𝐴2, … ,𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺  are the metrics from G experts. The average matrix 𝑀𝑀 = [𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] can be obtained 
as follows: 
𝑀𝑀 = [𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = [�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔]                                                                                                        (16)𝐺𝐺
𝑔𝑔=1
 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔 is the relative importance of Eg and ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔 = 1𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔=1 . 
Table 3. 
The synopsis of influence relationship and adjusting rules of CPCs (Hollnagel, 1998) 
Principal CPC (Influenced CPC) Component CPCs (Influencing CPCs) 
Working Condition (WCO) Adequacy of Organisation (AOO), Adequacy of Man Machine Interface 
and Shipboard Operational Support (MMI), Available Time (ATI), Time 
of day/ Circadian Rhythm (TOD), Adequacy of Training and Preparation 
(AOT) 
Number of Simultaneous Goals (NOS) WCO, MMI and Availability of Plans/Procedures (AOP) 
ATI WCO, MMI, AOP, NOS and TOD 
Crew Collaboration Quality (CCQ) AOO and AOT 
MMI AOO 
AOP AOO 
AOT AOO 
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Secondly, the normalized direct relation matrix X can be obtained by Eq. (17) (Wu, 2008; 
Shieh et al., 2010)  
 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀,                                                                                                                 (17) 
where 𝑏𝑏 = 1
𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
1≤𝑖𝑖≤9
∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
9
𝑖𝑖=1
. Each element in matrix falls between zero and one. 
Thirdly, the total matrix can be obtained by Eq. (18) 
 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑋𝑋(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑋𝑋)−1                                                                                                     (18) 
where I is the identity matrix. R and C are defined to represent the sum of rows and sum of 
columns of T, respectively. Ri, which is the sum of the ith row in matrix T, summarizes both 
direct and indirect effects given by CPCi to other CPCs. Ci, which is the sum of ith column in 
matrix T, shows both direct and indirect effects received by CPCi from the other CPCs. The 
sum (Ri+Ci) indicates the total effects given and received by CPCi. That is, the value of 
(Ri+Ci) stands for the degree of importance that CPCi plays in the entire system. On the 
contrary, the value of (Ri-Ci) shows the net effect that CPCi contributes to the system. 
Specifically, if (Ri-Ci) is positive, CPCi is a cause factor, while CPCi is a result factor if (Ri-Ci) 
is negative. 
Lastly, the weights of CPCs can be obtained. The value of (Ri+Ci) stands for the degree of 
importance of CPCi. The normalized weights of CPCs can therefore be calculated by  
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖∑ (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)9𝑖𝑖=1 × 9                                                                                                           (19) 
where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the weight of CPCi. 
3.2. Obtaining the adjusting index (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) of CPC levels 
The value of adjusting index is based on the weights of CPCs and fine-tuned in proportion. 
The adjusting indices of the CPCi’s levels, which have improved, not significant and reduced 
effects, are assigned to +𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 , zero and −𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 respectively. This is a general principle to convert 
weights to adjusting indices. However, if there are two levels being assigned the same effect, 
then the corresponding 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 value should be fine-tuned in proportion. For example, for “crew 
collaboration quality”, the four levels “very efficient”, “efficient”, “inefficient” and “deficient” 
have “improved”, “not significant”, “not significant” and “reduced” effects on performance 
reliability, respectively. According to the above general principle, the adjusting indices of 
both “efficient” and “inefficient” are zero, which does not well reflect the reality in measuring 
human reliability. Given the fact that the effect of “inefficient” on human reliability should be 
slightly “reduced” rather than “not significant”, its adjusting index 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 of the nth level of 
CPCi will be determined by proportion using a linear distribution. 
3.3. Calculating the CFP of sub-tasks 
In the general analysis, the context variable is defined as the overall state of context whose 
value is 𝛴𝛴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  -𝛴𝛴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 . When 𝛴𝛴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  - 𝛴𝛴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =0, the context would be the 
nominal state and HEP would be HEP0. However such a simple analysis may not be well 
suited to modelling the scenarios in the extended quantification, because a CPC has its 
specific effect role on human reliability. Therefore, the value of the functional relation x 
should be recalculated in a specific task context. 
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A new calculation approach, which can disclose the specific quantitative influence of a CPC 
on human reliability, is developed and described as follows: 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
                                                                                                 (20) 
where, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is the specific influence of CPCi on human reliability; 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the adjusting index of 
nth level of CPCi; 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the combined DoB of nth level of CPCi as mentioned in Section 
2.2.2. N=3 when i belongs to the set of (2, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8) while N=4 when i is equal to 1, 3 or 
9. 
Therefore, the overall quantitative influence of context can be indicated as follows: 
𝑥𝑥 = �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖9
𝑖𝑖=1
                                                                                                                  (21) 
Consequently, the quantitative evaluation of Cognitive Failure Probability (CFP) of each sub-
task is  
CFP=CFP0·exp(-0.619x)                                                                             (22) 
where exp(-0.619x) keeps consistence with its counterpart in Eq. (15) while CFP0 varies 
with respect to the cognitive function and generic failure type of sub-tasks. According to the 
extended CREAM method, CFP0 representing the basic values of generic cognitive function 
failure types will change as listed in Table 4 (Hollnagel, 1998). In the general analysis stage, 
HEP0=3.81E-3 is a holistic consideration of the whole task, while the cognitive function 
failure probability estimation should be carried out with respect to the adjusted CFP0. 
Table 4  
Basic values for generic cognitive failure types  
Cognitive function Generic failure type Basic value (CFP0) 
Observation O1 Wrong object observed 1.0E-3 
O2 Wrong identification 7.0E-2 
O3 Observation not made 7.0E-2 
Interpretation I1 Faulty diagnosis 2.0E-1 
I2 Decision error 1.0E-2 
I3 Delayed interpretation 1.0E-2 
Planning P1 Priority error 1.0E-2 
P2 Inadequate plan 1.0E-2 
Execution E1 Action of wrong type 3.0E-3 
E2 Action at wrong time 3.0E-3 
E3 Action on wrong object 5.0E-4 
E4 Action out of sequence 3.0E-3 
E5 Missed action 3.0E-2 
Source: Adopted from Hollnagel, (1998). 
4. Case study 
The statistics of marine accidents show that ship collision is the upmost hazard and could 
cause serious damage to the properties, environment and human lives. Previous studies have 
shown that human error is the main contributor of ship collision accidents (P&I Club, 1992; 
Pennie et al., 2007; Graziano et al., 2016) and attempts to reduce the marine accidents caused 
by human errors. In this section, a case investigating the collision avoidance of a particular 
scenario in Shanghai coastal waters is presented (See Table 6) to demonstrate the use of the 
modified methodology. Keeping sharp lookout, judgment of the risk of collision, and taking 
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anti-collision actions are key sub-tasks in collision avoidance for the involved officer on 
watch (OOW). Once errors or failures happened in these sub-tasks, a collision accident could 
occur. The question as to how the probability of the errors is obtained in a quantitative form 
needs to be answered. 
4.1. General analysis 
4.1.1. Evaluation of CPCs by experts 
First of all, two experts were invited to analyse the investigated case through a collaborative 
research project between Shanghai Maritime University and Shanghai Pilot Station. 
Therefore, they both well knew the above defined investigation context and were selected to 
evaluate the CPCs and provide their DoBs with respect to each CPC level. Their professional 
positions, service time and education backgrounds are described in Table 5. Table 6 shows 
the evaluations of each CPC given by the two selected experts. 
Table 5 
Description of the selected experts  
The expert Description of the expert selected 
E1 
A professor with a PhD degree who 
has been engaged in marine risk 
research for over 20 years and has a 
good understanding of organization of 
shipping and marine operations. He 
has also served as a chief mate on 
board ship continuously for 1 year 
during his professional career. 
E2 
A captain with a bachelor degree who 
has worked on board ship for 18 years 
(2 years of being a captain) and has a 
good safety record.  
 
Table 6 
The states of 9 CPCs and the evaluation from two experts 
CPC Description of situations Level 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2  
CPC1 
AOO 
 
The seafarers are organized as a framework of management-operational-support level. 
There is a validated Safety Management System and clear responsibilities to the crew 
members. The shipping company has a complete organizational structure and is able to 
provide the powerful shore-based support for the ships. 
L11 0.6 0.5 
L12 0.4 0.3 
L13  0 0.2 
L14  0 0 
CPC2 
WCO 
 
The bridge is small. The temperature is 30℃ due to that the air conditioner is 
temporarily not working. Wind is SE 10-12m/s. The vessel is slightly pitching and 
rolling. Environmental noise caused by VHF communications is serious. 
L21  0 0 
L22  0.4 0.7 
L23  0.6 0.3 
CPC3 
MMI 
The interface of the control panel including the monitors, knobs and buttons of the 
navigational aids (Radar, ARPA, AIS, GPS, engine telegraph, automatic helm, and so 
on) is relatively friendly. 
L31 0 0 
L32  0.8 0.6 
L33  0.2 0.3 
L34  0 0.1 
CPC4 
AOP 
The checklists and procedures for navigation in heavy weather, restricted visibility, 
narrow channels and coast waters in SMS are well-defined, however the planning of 
sailing in harbour areas is slightly insufficient, particularly the awareness and preparation 
for heavy traffic. 
L41  0.8 0.7 
L42  0.2 0.2 
L43  0 0.1 
CPC5 
NOS 
 
There are multiple simultaneous goals due to the heavy traffic density. The duty officer 
sometimes must contact with other vessels and take an action to avoid collision with 
fishing vessels at the same time. 
L51  0 0 
L52  1 1 
L53  0 0 
CPC6 
ATI 
 
Ship speed is reduced according to the speed limitation of traffic regulation, so the 
captain or officer has enough time to change the speed or alter the course for anti-
avoidance. But sometimes the operator is under a little high time pressure. 
L61 0.6 0.7 
L62  0.4 0.3 
L63  0 0 
CPC7 
TOD 
 
The time of the operation is from 1600 to 1900. The officer feel a little tired due to the 
preparation for sea at last midnight after discharging and loading.  
L71  0.4 0.6 
L72  0.6 0.4 
L73  0 0 
CPC8 
AOT 
The crew members with competence certifications have been trained at a maritime 
university and on-board. They familiar with the responsibilities. It is the 2nd time for the 
L81  0 0.2 
L82  0.8 0.8 
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 officer on watch (C/O) navigating in Shanghai waterways and coaster waters.  L83  0.2 0 
CPC9 
CCQ 
 
The captain, duty officer and helmsman have worked for the same shipping company for 
several years. They have been on board this ship and worked together for 2 months.  
L91  0.1 0 
L92  0.8 0.6 
L93  0.1 0.4 
L94  0 0 
 
4.1.2. Combination of the evaluations 
The weights of the two experts are assigned as (agreed among them) w1= 0.6 and w2=0.4 
according to their background information in Table 5. The basic probability masses for E1 
and E2 can be modelled using Eqs. (2) - (5). Taking CPC1 as an example, the basic 
probability masses are computed as Eqs. (23) and (24). 
E1: 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧
𝑚𝑚11
1 = 𝑤𝑤1𝛽𝛽111 = 0.6 × 0.6 = 0.36                                                                     
𝑚𝑚12
1 = 𝑤𝑤1𝛽𝛽121 = 0.6 × 0.4 = 0.24                                                                      
𝑚𝑚13
1 = 𝑤𝑤1𝛽𝛽131 = 0.6 × 0 = 0                                                                                
𝑚𝑚14
1 = 𝑤𝑤1𝛽𝛽141 = 0.6 × 0 = 0                                                                                
𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿1
1 = 1 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 1 − (0.36 + 0.24 + 0 + 0) = 0.4         
𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1
1 = 1 −𝑤𝑤1 = 1 − 0.6 = 0.4                                                          
𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1
1 = 𝑤𝑤1(1 −∑ 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) = 0.6 × �1 − (0.6 + 0.4 + 0 + 0)� = 0  
                    (23) 
 E2: 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧
𝑚𝑚11
2 = 𝑤𝑤2𝛽𝛽112 = 0.4 × 0.5 = 0.20                                                                     
𝑚𝑚12
2 = 𝑤𝑤2𝛽𝛽122 = 0.4 × 0.3 = 0.12                                                                     
𝑚𝑚13
2 = 𝑤𝑤2𝛽𝛽132 = 0.4 × 0.2 = 0.08                                                                     
𝑚𝑚14
2 = 𝑤𝑤2𝛽𝛽142 = 0.4 × 0 = 0                                                                               
𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿1
2 = 1 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 1 − (0.20 + 0.12 + 0.08 + 0) = 0.6  
𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1
2 = 1 −𝑤𝑤2 = 1 − 0.4 = 0.6                                                         
𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1
2 = 𝑤𝑤2(1− ∑ 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) = 0.4 × �1 − (0.6 + 0.4 + 0 + 0)� = 0 
                     (24) 
The basic probability masses 𝑚𝑚111 , 𝑚𝑚121 , 𝑚𝑚131  and 𝑚𝑚141  in Eq. (23), measure the DoBs exactly 
assigned to L11, L12, L13 and L14 by E1. The probability mass of E1 (𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿1
1 = 0.4) unassigned to 
any individual L1n is split into two parts, one caused by the relative importance of E1 (𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1
1 =0.4), and the other due to the incompleteness of the belief degree assessment 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖1  (𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔=0). 
Similarly, the basic probability masses from E2 can be modelled in Eq. (24). Using the same 
approach, the basic probability masses for the levels of other CPCs from E1 and E2 can be 
obtained. 
Next, the combination of the basic probability masses from the two experts can be conducted 
using Eqs. (6) - (10). 
{𝐿𝐿1𝑖𝑖}:
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧ {𝐿𝐿11}: 𝑚𝑚11𝐼𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(1+1) �𝑚𝑚11𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚112 + 𝑚𝑚11𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿12 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚112 �                                                   = 1.1617[0.36 × 0.20 + 0.36 × 0.6 + 0.4 × 0.20] = 0.4275{𝐿𝐿12}: 𝑚𝑚12𝐼𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(1+1) �𝑚𝑚12𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚122 + 𝑚𝑚12𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿12 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚122 �                                                   = 1.1617[0.24 × 0.12 + 0.24 × 0.6 + 0.4 × 0.12] = 0.2565{𝐿𝐿13}: 𝑚𝑚13𝐼𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(1+1) �𝑚𝑚13𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚132 + 𝑚𝑚13𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿12 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚132 �                                       = 1.1617[0 × 0.08 + 0 × 0.6 + 0.4 × 0.08] = 0.0372{𝐿𝐿14}: 𝑚𝑚14𝐼𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(1+1) �𝑚𝑚14𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚142 + 𝑚𝑚14𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿12 + 𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚142 �                         = 1.1617[0 × 0 + 0 × 0.6 + 0.4 × 0] = 0         
        (25) 
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𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1
𝐼𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(2) �𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖2 � = 1.1617[0.4 × 0.6] = 0.2788                                       (26) {𝐿𝐿1}:  𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(2) = 𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(2) �𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿12 + 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿12 + 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿12 � = 1.1617[0 × 0 + 0 × 0.6 + 0.4 × 0]= 0         (27) 
   𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼(2) = �1 −��𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼(1)𝑚𝑚1ℎ2𝑖𝑖
ℎ=1
ℎ≠𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
�
−1
 
= [1 − 0.36 × 0.12 + 0.36 × 0.08 + 0.36 × 0 + 0.24 × 0.20 + 0.24 × 0.08 + 0.24 × 0 + 0 × 0.20 + 0× 0.12 + 0 × 0 + 0 × 0.20 + 0 × 0.12 + 0 × 0.08]−1= 1.1617                                            (28) 
{𝐿𝐿1𝑖𝑖}:
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧{𝐿𝐿11}: 𝛽𝛽11 = 𝑚𝑚11𝐼𝐼(2)1 −𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(2) = 0.42751 − 0.2788 = 0.5928 ≅ 0.59{𝐿𝐿12}: 𝛽𝛽12 = 𝑚𝑚12𝐼𝐼(2)1 −𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(2) = 0.25651 − 0.2788 = 0.3557 ≅ 0.36{𝐿𝐿13}: 𝛽𝛽13 = 𝑚𝑚13𝐼𝐼(2)1 −𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(2) = 0.03721 − 0.2788 = 0.0516 ≅ 0.05{𝐿𝐿14}: 𝛽𝛽14 = 𝑚𝑚14𝐼𝐼(2)1 −𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(2) = 01 − 0.2788 = 0                         
                                 (29) 
{𝐿𝐿1}: 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿1 = 𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(2)1 −𝑚𝑚�𝐿𝐿1𝐼𝐼(2) = 01 − 0.2788 = 0                                                             (30) 
As a result, the combined DoBs of L11, L12, L13 and L14 of CPC1 are calculated as 0.5928, 
0.3557, 0.0516 and 0 respectively. Similarly, the combined DoBs associated with other CPCs 
can be obtained and presented in Table 7. 
Table 7 
The combined DoBs of each level of 9 CPCs 
CPCs DoBs 
CPC1 (L11, 0.59); (L12, 0.36); (L13, 0.05); (L14, 0) 
CPC2 (L21, 0); (L22, 0.51); (L23, 0.49) 
CPC3 (L31, 0); (L32, 0.77); (L33, 0.21); (L34, 0.02) 
CPC4 (L41, 0.80); (L42, 0.17); (L43, 0.03) 
CPC5 (L51, 0); (L52, 1); (L53, 0) 
CPC6 (L61, 0.66); (L62, 0.34); (L63, 0) 
CPC7 (L71, 0.47); (L72, 0.53); (L73, 0) 
CPC8 (L81, 0.05); (L82, 0.84); (L83, 0.11) 
CPC9 (L91, 0.06); (L92, 0.77); (L93, 0.17); (L94, 0) 
 
4.1.3. HEP of the whole task 
Next, the couple (∑Improved, ∑Reduced) can be calculated by summing up the DoBs of the 
improved and reduced effects. ∑Improved=0.59+0+0+0.80+0.66+0.05+0.06=2.16 and 
∑Reduced=0.05+0+0.49+0.02+0.03+0+0+0.53+0+0.11+0=1.23. (∑Improved, ∑Reduced) are 
obtained as (2.16, 1.23). For the specific anti-collision task in Shanghai coastal waters, the 
control mode is estimated as tactical and the corresponding probability interval is (0.001, 
0.1). Furthermore, the value of context variable x is 2.16-1.23=0.93 in a general analysis. 
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Consequently, the associated error probability (per anti-collision operation under the 
proposed context is computed as follows using Eq. (15). 
       HEP = 3.81×10-3 exp (-0.619x) = 0.00381exp (-0.619×0.93) =2.14×10-3 
This point value is located in the probability interval (0.001, 0.1) of the tactical control mode 
in CREAM. 
4.2. Extended quantification of HEP 
4.2.1. The weights of CPCs  
The two experts were also invited to evaluate the relationship among CPCs in the defined 
context under investigation. The two 9×9 matrices containing the two experts’ judgements on 
CPCs dependency are presented as follows. 
A1 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 2 2.5 2 0 0 0 2 1.50 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 00 1 0 0 1.5 2 0 0 00 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 ,  A2 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 1.5 2 2 0 0 0 1.5 20 0 0 0 2.8 3 0 0 00 2 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 00 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 00 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 1.5 0 0 0 1 0 0 00 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
The value of 2 in the first row and second column of matrix A1 indicates that expert E1 
believes CPC1 has “medium” influence on CPC2 under the given scenario. This evaluation is 
also made by refereeing the influence relationship defined in CREAM (in Table 3). The 
numerical values at the diagonal of each matrix are 0 because a CPC cannot affect itself. 
Using Eq. (16), the average matrix of A1 and A2 (w1= 0.6, w2=0.4) is obtained as follows. 
M =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 1.80 2.30 2.00 0 0 0 1.80 1.700 0 0 0 2.32 2.40 0 0 00 1.40 0 0 1.30 1.80 0 0 00 0 0 0 1 1.50 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 2.30 0 0 00 0.80 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 1.20 0 0 0 1.60 0 0 00 0.80 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
Next the normalized direct matrix is calculated by Eq. (17). 
X =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 0.1875 0.2396 0.2083 0 0 0 0.1875 0.17710 0 0 0 0.2417 0.2500 0 0 00 0.1458 0 0 0.1354 0.1875 0 0 00 0 0 0 0.1042 0.1563 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0.2396 0 0 00 0.0833 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0.1250 0 0 0 0.1667 0 0 00 0.0833 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.20830 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
Consequently, the total relation matrix T is obtained as follows:  
T =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 0.2521 0.2396 0.2083 0.1151 0.1681 0 0.1875 0.21610 0.0263 0 0 0.2480 0.3160 0 0 00 0.1685 0 0 0.1761 0.2718 0 0 00 0.0155 0 0 0.1079 0.1860 0 0 00 0.0205 0 0 0.0050 0.2459 0 0 00 0.0855 0 0 0.0207 0.0263 0 0 00 0.1425 0 0 0.0344 0.2106 0 0 00 0.0855 0 0 0.0207 0.0263 0 0 0.20830 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
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According to Section 3.1.3, Ri is the sum of the ith row of matrix T and Ci is the sum of ith 
column of matrix T. Values of Ri, Ci, (Ri+Ci) and (Ri-Ci) are obtained and presented in Table 
8 according to Eq. (18) 
 
Table 8 
The Ri , Ci , (Ri+Ci )and (Ri-Ci) values of CPCs 
CPCs CPC1 CPC2 CPC3 CPC4  CPC5 CPC6 CPC7 CPC8 CPC9 
Ri 1.3868 0.5904 0.6164 0.3094 0.2713 0.1325 0.3876 0.3409 0 
Ci 0 0.7965 0.2396 0.2083 0.7279 1.4510 0 0.1875 0.4245 
Ri+Ci 1.3868 1.3869 0.8560 0.5177 0.9992 1.5835 0.3876 0.5284 0.4245 
Ri-Ci 1.3868 -0.2061 0.3769 0.1011 -0.4565 -1.3185 0.3876 0.1534 -0.4245 
 
In the second column of Table 8, the value of 1.3868 in the second row indicates both the 
direct and indirect effects given by CPC1. The value of 0 in the third row represents both 
direct and indirect effects received by CPC1 from the other CPCs. The value of 1.3868 in the 
fourth row shows the total effects produced by CPC1. The value of 1.3868 in the fifth row 
means the net effect that CPC1 contributes to the system. Thus, the importance of the nine 
CPCs can be prioritized as C6＞C2＞C1＞C5＞C3＞C8＞C4＞C9＞C7 based on their individual 
(R+C) values. The weights (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) of CPCs (Table 9) can also be calculated using Eq. (19). 
4.2.2. The adjusting index of CPC levels  
Next the adjusting index (denoted as 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) of CPCs’ levels can be determined according to the 
rules described in Section 3.2. For example, the weight of CPC1 AOO is 1.55. The adjusting 
index of “very efficient”, “efficient” and “deficient” can therefore be 1.55, 0 and -1.55 due to 
their individual most positive effect, neutral effect and most negative effect. For the level of 
“inefficient”, its effect on human reliability is negative, but the degree of effect is less than 
“deficient”. Its adjusting index is thus calculated as 0.78 using a linear distribution. In a 
similar way, all adjusting indices (Table 9) of the 9 CPCs’ levels can be determined. 
Table 9 
The weights of CPCs and adjusting index of CPCs’ levels 
CPCs CPC1 CPC2 CPC3 CPC4 CPC5 CPC6 CPC7 CPC8 CPC9 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 1.55 1.55 0.95 0.58 1.11 1.77 0.43 0.59 0.47 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖1 1.55 1.55 0.95 0.58 0 1.77 0 0.59 0.47 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖2 0 0 0 0 -0.56 0 -0.22 0 0 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖3 -0.78 -1.55 0 -0.58 -1.11 -1.77 -0.43 -0.59 -0.24 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖4 -1.55 -- -0.95 -- -- -- -- -- -0.47 
 
4.2.3. CFP of sub-tasks of ship collision avoidance 
The specific effects of CPCs can be quantified using Eq. (20). For example,  
𝑥𝑥1 = ∑ 𝛿𝛿1𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = (1.55 × 0.59) + ( 0 × 0.36) + ( −0.78 × 0.05) + (−1.55 × 0) = 0.8755. 
Similarly, the specific effects of all 9 CPCs are obtained as [𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖] = [0.8755,−0.7595,−0.0190, 0.4466,−0.5600, 1.1682,−0.1166,−0.0354,−0.0126]. 
Consequently, the total context influence on CFP is obtained using Eq. (21). 
𝑥𝑥 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 0.999𝑖𝑖=1 . 
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Compared to the context variable value of 0.93 in the general analysis, 0.99 in extended 
quantification analysis is slightly larger. The difference between two values is caused by the 
introduction of the different weights of CPCs and adjusting indices of their ranking levels 
when considering their dependency in specific task context. 
In Table 10, the whole task of ship anti-collision is divided into sub-tasks and possible errors 
are identified. Cognitive functions of sub-tasks and generic failure types of possible errors are 
analyzed to determine the basic value of each possible error. Then the adjusted probabilities 
of possible errors can be calculated using Eq.22. 
Table 10 Extended analysis and quantification for ship collision avoidance 
Sub-task in ship collision avoidance Possible errors Cognitive function Generic failure type CFP0 
Adjusted 
CFP 
1 
Observation 
1.1 Visual observation 
Not maintaining 
Continuous visual 
lookout 
Observation O3 Observation not made 7.00E-02 3.79E-02 
1.2 Observation via navigational 
aids Inadequate use of aids Observation 
O2 Wrong 
identification 7.00E-02 3.79E-02 
1.3 Communication with other 
ship 
Communication 
interrupt Execution E5 Missed action 3.00E-02 1.63E-02 
1.4 Comparison of information Comparison error Interpretation I3 Delayed interpretation 1.00E-02 5.42E-03 
2 
Judgment 
2.1 Judgment of Risk of collision Wrong judgment Interpretation I1 Faulty diagnosis 2.00E-01 1.08E-01 
2.2 Evaluation of situation Wrong judgment Interpretation I1 Faulty diagnosis 2.00E-01 1.08E-01 
2.3 Choice of applicable items in 
COLREG 72 Select wrong items Planning P2 Inadequate plan 1.00E-02 5.42E-03 
3 
Decision-
making 
3.1 Decision of action to avoid 
collision Wrong action Interpretation I2 Decision error 1.00E-02 5.42E-03 
3.2 Decision of time of action Wrong time Planning P1 Priority error 1.00E-02 5.42E-03 
4 
Action 4.1 Alter course or/and speed 
Improper 
implementation Execution 
E1 Action of wrong 
type 3.00E-03 1.63E-03 
 
4.3. Model validation and result comparison 
4.3.1. Validation using sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is a study on how the uncertainty in the output of a model can be 
apportioned to different sources of uncertainty in the model input. It is a method for testing 
the degree of sensitivity of a model's variables. The sensitivity analysis was carried out by 
changing the evaluation of CPC1 by E1. The original expert evaluation values associated with 
L11 were decreased from 0.6 to 0.1 at a step of 0.1. The assumption made is that the trend line 
of certain CFPs should increase steadily. The trend lines of selective CFPs are illustrated in 
Fig.2. 
 
Fig.2 The trend lines of selective CFPs  
A similar proposed approach is applied to determine if small changes of input variables will 
induce the corresponding changes in the output results of CFPs. It can be observed from the 
0.00E+00
5.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.50E-01
2.00E-01
0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
CF
P
Expert evaluation values associated with L11of CPC1 by E1
1.1
2.1
3.1
4.1
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trend lines in Figure 2 that four selective CFPs have increased correspondingly with 
increment of evaluation values. Additionally, no abrupt large changes of CFPs were 
generated in the sensitivity analysis. Therefore, the model is able to illustrate the differences 
and has partially validated the model developed. 
4.3.2. Result comparison  
The cognitive model and framework of CREAM could be used in retrospective and 
prospective analysis. However, the quantification results provided are mainly based on the 
expert specification on CPCs. Lack of data, which makes it inevitable to adopt expert 
judgment, is the most important source of the uncertainty for many HRA methods (He et al., 
2008) including the proposed method. The knowledge and experience imparity of experts 
leads to evaluation differences on CPCs and further on HRA analysis results. Therefore, the 
ER algorithm is used to deal with the differential judgments of experts. The quantification 
results derived from E1, E2 and ER algorithm are compared respectively. From Table 11, we 
can find that the CFP values derived from ER algorithm fall between the values resulted from 
two experts. It shows the strength of ER algorithm in the proposed method on dealing with 
the uncertainties from experts’ judgments. 
Table 11 Comparison of results 
Sub-tasks CFP0 
By E1 By E2 Combined 
CFP1 CFP2 CFP 
1 
1.1 7.00E-02 4.43E-02 3.72E-02 3.79E-02 
1.2 7.00E-02 4.43E-02 3.72E-02 3.79E-02 
1.3 3.00E-02 1.90E-02 1.60E-02 1.63E-02 
1.4 1.00E-02 6.33E-03 5.32E-03 5.42E-03 
2 
2.1 2.00E-01 1.27E-01 1.06E-01 1.08E-01 
2.2 2.00E-01 1.27E-01 1.06E-01 1.08E-01 
2.3 1.00E-02 6.33E-03 5.32E-03 5.42E-03 
3 
3.1 1.00E-02 6.33E-03 5.32E-03 5.42E-03 
3.2 1.00E-02 6.33E-03 5.32E-03 5.42E-03 
4 4.1 3.00E-03 1.90E-03 1.60E-03 1.63E-03 
 
Additionally, real data has been collected to validate the above result. Since Sep. 30th 2011 
until Oct. 1st 2012, the operational data under the same context in Shanghai coastal waters has 
been collected and recorded. From the recorded data, it is revealed that from 2688 events that 
could lead to the error of “not maintaining continuous visual lookout or/and inadequate use of 
aids”, 81 errors actually occurred (Fang et al., 2012). The error rate is 0.0301. The closeness 
of 0.0379 and 0.0301 shows a fairly good consistency between the estimated value and the 
real error rate, thus also provide evidence to support the research findings and proposed 
quantification method in this paper. 
 
5. Conclusion 
A new HEP quantification methodology is proposed based on the ER approach, DEMATEL 
and CREAM. It can be used for not only a general analysis but also the quantitative 
evaluation of HRA in maritime operations. The procedure of quantification is described and 
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an illustrative case study is produced. A sensitivity analysis and comparison of quantification 
results is carried out for the validation of the newly proposed model. 
The belief degree approach, instead of the deterministic one-or-zero way in specification of 
CPCs, can well model the uncertainty and be more practical when adopting experts’ 
judgments. The ER algorithm can combine the different evaluations to improve the 
limitations of knowledge and experience of every expert in CPCs specification. The weights 
generated by DEMATEL and adjusted indices derived from the weights express the various 
influences of CPCs in a practical operation. Therefore, compared to the previous CREAM 
based HEP quantification studies, the new method has shown its superiority due to the fact 
that (1) the ER approach with the belief degree manner can deal with the uncertainties caused 
by insufficient information and data in the evaluation of CPCs and be capable of combining 
the DoBs from different sources; (2) setting of the adjusting indices based on the DEMATEL 
technique allows different importance of CPCs and more sensitive estimation of HEP. 
This paper focuses on the development of the new modified CREAM method and its 
application in the maritime industry. The propagation of an event is made through the 
representation of a scenario of maritime operation. It is believed that the method provides 
useful insights on a systemic and structural cognitive task analysis of complex systems and 
hence will facilitate cognitive HRA in other sectors to enhance incorporation of human 
element in the safety management of critical systems. However, it only focuses on how 
seafarers’ actions can fail, and concerns the human element in seafarers’ reliability analysis. 
It has therefore revealed its applicability and limits in practice, with respect to Prof Eric 
Hollnagel’s disclaimers on CREAM in his personal website.   
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